Analysis

The Peter Tucker Commission and Functional Immunity

17 April 2007 at 11:25 | 1327 views

"If we surmise that the incumbent is vicariously using the Constitutional Review Commission to protect a retiring President from the prospect of the Special Court from reaching him on the morrow of leaving State House, it was dealt a blow on May 31, 2004, when the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in Freetown ruled unanimously that Charles Taylor does not enjoy any immunity from prosecution by the Court though he was the serving Head of State of Liberia at the time criminal proceedings were initiated."

By John Lansana Musa, USA.

On the heels of Dr. Peter Tucker’s News Conference at the British Council in Freetown, where he presented a resume of the Constitutional Review Commission Report, he has been greeted with dissentience about his timing in urging Parliament to amend the existing constitution. The Commission has had the temerity to ask a referendum in the offing of a watershed election to adopt the proposed amendments. The long awaited constitutional review mandated in at the Lome Accord has at last come to the fore of the nation not amidst huzzas but frowns.

Moreover, germane questions are being raised over the propriety of the proposed amendments to Act No. 6, 1991 (Constitution of Sierra Leone), especially in the matter of granting a perpetual immunity to a President of Sierra Leone beyond his official duties. A person enjoys functional immunity or Immunity Ratione Materiae for all acts committed in his official capacity. The part of the 1991 Constitution earmarked for amendment is Section 48 on "Incidents of Office," resembles Functional Immunity.

We have something to add to these complaints and this perhaps is the auspicious time to assert them to the learned Dr. Peter Tucker and his Commission in the following essay. To appreciate the present exposition, we must refer to the whole section in the existing constitution of Sierra Leone. Then, we look at where the framers borrowed the idea of clothing the President of Sierra Leone with Immunity Ratione Materiae or functional immunity and what it portends for the cultivation of the Rule of Law in principle.

Accordingly, Section 48 grants the following incidents to the Office of President in Sierra Leone:

" (1) The President shall receive such salary and allowances as may be prescribed by Parliament and such salary and allowances payable to the President are hereby charged on the Consolidated Fund.

(2) The salary and allowances of the President shall not be altered to his disadvantage during his tenure of office.

(3) The President shall be exempted from personal taxation.

(4) While any person holds or performs the functions of the office of President, no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against him in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by him either in his official or private capacity.

(5) The President shall be entitled to such pension and retiring benefits as shall be prescribed by Parliament."

While the immunity protects the sitting head of state from prosecution in his domestic courts, it is now a well-established principle of international law, that functional immunity does not stand in the way of a prosecution for international crimes especially in certain international tribunals.

In the present discussion, clause 4 of section 48 emerges as the heart of the matter which presumes the Peter Tucker Constitutional Review Commission wants to extend the spirit of the immunity beyond the presidential tenure to life. We are prompted to leave to conjecture why the Peter Tucker commission conceived of extending this immunity or its kindred status to life. Since Section 48 veils the incumbent President and all his successors in office from prosecution while in office, what motivated the Commissioners to frame an amendment beyond the presidency to life?

Is the long arm of international criminal tribunals poised to prosecute someone who bears the "greatest responsibility," for the yet unexplained war crimes after the death of the principals, Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, Samuel Hinga Norman, and the disappearance of the indicted Johnny Paul Koroma before the Special Court for Sierra Leone?

If we surmise that the incumbent is vicariously using the Constitutional Review Commission to protect a retiring President from the prospect of the Special Court from reaching him on the morrow of leaving State House, it was dealt a blow on May 31, 2004, when the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in Freetown ruled unanimously that Charles Taylor does not enjoy any immunity from prosecution by the Court though he was the serving Head of State of Liberia at the time criminal proceedings were initiated.

Apart from this conjecture, the vexing aspect of the proposed amendment is that it places a retiring President above the Rule of Law. Why has the Peter Tucker Commission seen fit to extend this immunity to life when its spirit is understandable when a President holds officce? Is such an amendment warranted in a democratic society or in conformity with international law standards of Universal Jurisdiction for serious breaches of international crimes if they are to be preferred in the future?

The notion that no one is above the law in terms of prosecuting war crimes or serious breaches of international law is not new. It is as old as the hills. It developed first under article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) whereby the former Kaiser, William II, was indicted before a special tribunal constituted by the victorious powers. Then came to the trials before the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals at the end of World War II.

Dr. Peter Tucker should keep the following imperatives in mind as he attempts to break new ground in the constitutionalism of Sierra Leone:

That Article 6 of the Special Court Statute states without reservation,

"The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment."

That the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its Judgment in The Congo v. Belgium (or the Yerodia case), concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11. April 2000, Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, 14., stated

"modern state practice and opinion juris deny immunities for core crimes to all former and incumbent state officials with the sole exception of the highest state representatives such as Heads of State or Ministers for Foreign Affairs; and even these persons are protected only while in office (as was been demonstrated in the Pinochet case)."
The Court concluded,

"After a careful consideration of international jurisprudence, the principle seems now established that the sovereign equality of states does not prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal or court."

And more applicable as controlling legal authority would be the Taylor Decision where the Appeal Chamber said:

"We hold that the official position of the Applicant as an incumbent Head of State at the time when these criminal proceedings were initiated against him is not a bar to his prosecution by this court. The Applicant was and is subject to criminal proceedings before the Special Court for Sierra Leone."

The Court affirmed the principles of international law which seem to escape the notice of the Peter Tucker Commission, our agelong lawgiver who cobbled the organic instrument called the 1991 constitution.

The question arising from these historic decisions is whether the Peter Tucker Constitutional Commission ever read or sought to regard these judgements as they impinge on their proposed amendment to extend the immunity grant to the life of a former President. A kindred question arising from the same matter is this: If Chief Norman served as DEPUTY Minister of Defence and was linked in the chain of Command Responsibility for war crimes, is the Peter Tucker Commission foreseeing the indictment of Ex President Kabbah and is preparing to clothe him in life immunity from prosecution?

If that is the ulterior motive as it is selfevident, we already know that such ignorance led the Kabbah administration to request the UN Security Council to establish a special court, believing in the narrow compass that the proposed dragnet would prosecute only the RUF and that it will not reach the corridors of any high office in Sierra Leone until Chief Hinga Norman was charged and tried for war crimes. It is a standing rule with all prosecutors that the evidence leads them to everybody.

To public mortification, this manifest ignorance was compounded by failure to know that amnesties and reprieves such as granted in the Lome Accord to all combatants were only good for domestic courts while international tribunals frown and except them for war crimes or grave breaches of international law. As it were, in the aftermath of Norman’s indictment and arrest, the chastened Kabbah administration expressed consternation at Norman’s indictment. The prospect that the proposed amendment will shield any suspect against prosecution by grafting an amendment over section 48 is akin to building castles in the air.

If this be conjecture of the immunity for life for President Kabbah, we can further hazard a guess that President Kabbah gave us a clue when he interposed a feeble excuse when Chief Hinga Norman attempted to serve him a subpoena to testify at the CDF trial and Attorney General Carew demurred and cited Section 48. One would think, a Comander-in-Chief would have on his own volition even given testimony by deposition if not in court. But he claimed immunity to testify. So a fortiori, one must hazard this guess that the amendment is not in the public interest but safe harbor from prosecution.

To be sure, it is a march of folly to think that the Special Court failed to notice the Attorney General’s desperate attempt to veil President Kabbah from giving testimony on denuded grounds. But if Ex President Kabbah tries to interpose the amended version of Section 48 extending immunity beyond his stewardship as a President, it is doomed to failure for the Special Court will appropriately cite the Appeal Chamber Decision (Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case, No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 31 May 2004.), to arrest Mr. Kabbah for war crimes if the Prosecutor so finds.

More than these musings, Dr. Peter Tucker should keep the admonition of renown jurists in mind when he further contemplates the principles and practice of the Rule of Law and when the Commission Report is properly aborted by Parliament for untimeliness to amend the constitution in an election year. If he and his commission subscribe to that fashion of democracy, then he ought to perish the late contentions of Aristotle, Ulpian, Sir Robert Filmer, Thomas Hobbes and other philosophers of Absolutism and turn his mind to modern jurists of note such A.V. Dicey.

The contentions of a pair of these philosophers in particular seem to dominate Dr. Peter Tucker’s constitution-making. The Constitutional Review Commission seems in concord with Aristotle on this immunity matter when he says that

"a perfect Kingdom is that wherein the King rules all things according to his Own Will, for he that is called a King according to the Law, makes no kind of Kingdom at all."

When we turn to the Roman jurisconsult Ulpian, the Review Commission finds solace in his definition of the leader’s authority as follows:

"quod principi placuit vigorem legis habet - what pleases the prince has the force of law (Dig. 1.4.1) .

Then Ulpian further professes that

"princeps legibus solutus est- the prince is not bound by the law" (Dig. 1.3.31).

Twelfth-century jurists used these two maxims to establish two principles: that the prince can legislate and that he can change law at will. Why then after the imperial presidency of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah found in many abuses of applying the 1991 Constitution with a recumbent Supreme Court as his "Amen Corner,"do we suppose he will not attempt to escape the scrutiny of the Special Court by amending the Constitution of Sierra Leone to wrap him in life immunity protection from prosecution were the prospect looming on the horizon that the Prosecutor will prefer charges against him?

If these speculations are for nought, then what has the Peter Tucker Commission wrought in returning the Republic of Sierra Leone to the servile days of Ulpian, Hobbes, Filmer, the craven apostles of absolutism, when the leader is not bound by the law because he decides what the law should be?

If these elementary questions do not yet provoke modern constitutionalism as we approach a generation and 16 years since flag-Independence, we must demand that the next attempt to reform or remark the republic should be undertaken by a Constituent Assembly of experts instead of a popular concert of an Alhaji, a Pastor, a Paramount Chief, one lawyer, and others forming a review commission more akin to those joining Noah in the Ark.

But we must return to the heart of the matter before us if we aspire to modern constitutionalism. If Sierra Leoneans still long for the relics of colonial rule as our Constitutional Review Commission remains faithful to the traditions of abandoned legal traditions even in our colonial fatherland, we know that Bracton professed that the Crown was subject to the rule of law. He argued that the King or Crown was under the law when he decided the case, Burmah Oil Co.Ltd.-v- the Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75, p147. There, he said abundantly what seems to elude Dr. Peter Tucker and his Commission:

"quia lex facit regem. ... Non est enim Rex, ubi dominatur voluntas et non lex." That the Criwn was under the law.

What is more, Professor A.V. Dicey in his seminal work "Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution," on the subject of "the Rule of Law" has held:

"[The Rule of Law] means in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government. Englishmen are ruled by law, and law alone; a man may with us be punished for a breach of the law, but he can be punished for nothing else.

We mean in the second place, .... not only that with us no man is above the law, but (what is a different thing) that here every man, whatever his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. ...

With us every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen. A Colonial Governor, a Secretary of State, a military officer, and all subordinates, though carrying out the commands of their official superiors, are as responsible for any act which the law does not authorise as is any private or unofficial person ..." (see A.V. Dicey "Introduction to the Law of the Constitution" (1885) 10th. edn., London 1959, p.202-203).

In light of these contentions, it is now left with Parliament to decide whether ours is a country governed by the Rule of Law or she must enact an amendment or yield her legislative competence to personal interests that some sierra Leone are above the law as if it were after the fashion of the patrimony of those who now rule us with a seeming imperial Presidency where the President is SOLUTUS LEGIBUS. The spectacle dethrones all our liberties to the personal caprice of patrimonialism.

Photo: President Kabbah of Sierra Leone. Smelling the rat?

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