Commentary
By Christopher E.S. Warburton, PhD Econ.
The concept of globalization may mean different things to different categories of people, but its inevitability is no longer in doubt. From China to India, North America to Mexico, and Europe to Africa, it has forever changed the lives of many for better or worse. Yet, economists, like philosophers, or good policy makers, like critical thinkers, rationalize the basis of policy choices before reaching a conclusion. Without any formal instruction, rational man intuitively evaluates the cost and benefit of complicating options before making a definitive choice. The embrace of, or revulsion against globalization cannot be perceived otherwise. It is a concept that merits thoughtful consideration of social cost and benefit as less competitive economies continue to struggle with poverty, inflation, and inadequate innovation that put them in a steady state of misery.
What exactly is globalization? By “globalization,” I mean economic integration that is driven by technological innovation to reduce the cost of production, increase consumption, and enhance human welfare. Understandably, not every human will concede to the welfare-enhancing power of global economic integration that I am predisposed to boastfully extol in the face of environmental degradation, limitless financial contagion, or even the maldistribution of income. But the adversities only remind us of manageable social costs that should be evaluated against social benefits for the minimization of unwarranted costs.
Not all aspects of globalization are pernicious or socially harmful, especially when the results of globalization are increased productivity, increased income, the minimization of poverty, infrastructural improvement, and sustained use of environmental resources as humans become prosperous and smarter. Invariably, from Mexico to China, and India to Bangladesh, or Japan to China, humans salivate at the prospects of increasing their income or becoming the beneficiaries of the next cutting-edge technology. Why is it that the poor countries of Africa cannot be integrated promptly into this inevitable flow of dynamism that is reshaping the world forever?
I dare not state that it is a lack of understanding or foresight in an age of information diffusion, but I also hesitate to presume to know the real answers, except that I might be tempted to search for those human instincts that are risk averse, apathetic, or introspective. As the world became flatter, in Friedman’s parlance, some African countries were caught flat-footed. This is probably surprising because globalization has never been a novel phenomenon in the contemporary world. The only matter of perceived novelty, if there is conceivably any, is the impulse behind innovation and the effects of innovation on human welfare. This means that globalization has manifested itself in discernible phases.
The first wave of globalization occurred between 1870 and 1914 and it impacted transportation costs in significant ways to expedite communication and the transfer of goods to market for consumption and profit. It was an era of the steam revolution that was spurred by American and European talent and businesses. Unfortunately, it also witnessed the colonization of Sierra Leone and other African states.
After the World Wars, a second phase of globalization started, which existed till 1980 [noticeably]. This was a period in which colonialism ended for African countries (Zimbabwe joining the ranks in April 1980), but it was also an era of lost opportunities in the quest of global economic integration. Specialization in production, based on eighteenth century trade theory of comparative advantage, defined global economic relations. The timing was propitious for the survival of the theory. After all, the African economies had just been restructured into the agrarian and extractive model that is consistent with the comparative advantage paradigm of efficient use of plentiful resource(s)-a trade theory that was based on increasing opportunity cost.
In the struggle for emancipation from colonialism, comparative advantage was disparaged, if not derided, by nationalists and Marxists alike who repositioned the theory on a core-periphery matrix. Japan found its niche in the auto industry by agglomerating its industries to reduce cost, encouraging vertical integration, relocating its industries to attain proximity, and producing coveted commodities of the world, like Hondas and Toyotas.
But Sierra Leoneans and other West Africans had a sense of the globalized world; the world in which technology was not yet advanced enough to outsource, insource, or supply-chain the consumption and production of goods. That world awaited the Internet, the innovation that modified the fundamental premise of comparative advantage and forced economists to go in search of new theories of international trade. Not that comparative advantage was figuratively mortally flawed or wounded; like free trade, it merely lost its innocence irretrievably. The know-how component of production, once a Solow residual, suddenly became a very important component of the labor-capital dichotomy. A new theory, “dynamic-comparative-advantage,” embellished the lexicon of international economists.
Sierra Leone and other West African states did not have to figure out the meaning of globalization. Trade restraints, limited markets, and plummeting prices of agricultural products, not to mention the oil crisis, immediately sensitized West African governments to changing economic conditions. They inadvertently figured out what we now call “globalization” and came together to form the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975.
What was originally envisioned as a free trade area of sort was the beginning of a process for an economic union, the highest stage of economic integration in the globalized world; simply put, the renunciation of the right to make monetary policy in order to check inflation and foster competitiveness. In an ideal state, economic resources-labor, capital, and entrepreneurial skill should then move liberally in and out of member states-with the hope that economic shocks (temporary fluctuations in output/unemployment) will be symmetrical and that the eco will then replace the leone and other local national currencies of the monetary zone (end of seigniorage and monetary sovereignty).
The apogee of preferential trade agreement or monetary convergence in the region has coexisted with the latest wave of globalization-the third phase that came with the Internet and electronic revolution. Indeed, this has been the most acknowledged phase of globalization. The crystallization of European monetary union in 1999 became a reality after the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It was by any measure, a protracted process that has been respected by aspiring regions of the world to become competitive in world trade and maintain stable exchange rates. Emulators however run the risk of missing the vital clues that the path to globalization is not monolithic-not with immobile factors of production, cultural intolerance within and across national frontiers, or structurally invariant economies.
Unlike the CFA franc region, which enjoyed monetary consolidation in the 1940’s and continues to benefit from proxy dollarization through the French Treasury and the euro, some nations of West Africa, including Sierra Leone, were not so lucky and must now decide how they are going to be integrated into the global economy. Of course, the ultimate challenges confronting these nations are run-away inflation, lack of productivity, inconvertible or overvalued currencies, and lack of foreign investment to augment national saving. Oil rich Nigeria is a notable exception to the quest of foreign investment. Its foreign direct investment inflow is known to exceed that of dollarized Panama in recent years. Gambia has consistently done well to meet its convergence criteria obligation, particularly in the domain of inflation.
Nigeria also did well to obtain beta (growth rate) and sigma (dispersion) convergence in its fight against inflation in 2006 and 2007, but even the economic power house of the region could not be insulated from the global financial meltdown or tsunami of 2008, which destabilized its economy and pushed its inflation rate into double digits. This means that starting with a very high inflation rate in 2000, for example, its inflation rate grew at a very slow pace to converge with Gambia. The opposite occurred with the inflation rates of Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Guinea. For example, inflation grew exponentially in Sierra Leone. The failure of Nigeria and others is noticeably ominous. Can a monetary union be designed to perfectly and collectively withstand exogenous external shocks over a brief or protracted period?
Globalization by convertible currency
The European example, which has been given considerable attention, might erroneously suggest that monetary union is the only way to a globalized economy. But there are the imperfect, but alternative examples of dollarization in Panama, Ecuador, and El Salvador.
This thought is particularly unavoidable because of the recurrent failure of the WAMZ countries to obtain convergence on the major issues-inflation, government deficit, central bank financing of government deficit, and foreign reserves for potential imports in the short-run. Failure has been recurrent-2003, 2005, and most likely in December 2009. Why should this be an extraordinary deficiency for the die-hard optimist? Of course, it took the Europeans over a generation. Yet, with rigid economic structures and counterproductive time lags, the opportunity cost of economic disintegration is inordinately costly for Sierra Leone.
For the sake of brevity, I will not recount the debilitating challenges of monetary union and the prospects of sustainability (including political risks); it is worth noting however, that after losing so many opportunities to be integrated into the global economy, it will be a very wise idea for the policy makers of Sierra Leone to urgently consider the introduction and promise of a convertible currency for global economic integration and development.
Long memory indicates that some of the costs of currency substitution-loss of seigniorage (the revenue obtained from printing money when the cost of printing is less than the nominal value of money) and monetary autonomy are closely aligned with the reasons for the inconvertibility or failure of national currencies in the first place. For example, a major source of inflation is the financing of government deficit by less autonomous central banks.
Loss of nationalism as a cost or a betrayal of national sentiment is no longer an issue when nations make a commitment to have a single currency. However, the Europeans managed to maintain historical sentiments by inscription of specific and diverse national reminiscences on their currency. Ironically, profligate fiscal policies of the past and indiscriminate, if not unmerited personalization of national currency, squandered what was left of monetary nationalism in Sierra Leone. In fact, countervailing such a sentiment against globalization is now a false choice. Monetary nationalism and globalization are incompatible, if not strange bed fellows.
Rethinking the logic of stable exchange rate and development now requires a careful reconsideration of a commitment to treaty obligations (pacta sunt servanda) and fundamental change of circumstances (clausula rebus sic stantibus). However, the potential for increased poverty, incompetent or less prepared workforce tomorrow, and the specter of economic decline, put the social cost-benefit matrix in a sobering perspective.
Unless there is a convertible currency to attract foreign capital and reduce inflation significantly, Sierra Leone is poised to lose another era of global economic integration. The costs of a failure to globalize will be staggering for future generation of Sierra Leoneans-more Sierra Leoneans will fall below absolute poverty lines (living on less than $1 or $2 a day), net capital outflows will increase, infrastructure will deteriorate, hyperinflation will complicate the stabilization process, and unemployment will soar-the obvious stagflation (high inflation and unemployment) cocktail.
The need to globalize Sierra Leone is no longer an option. It is the inevitable choice for the growth and prosperity of a nation with an unrelenting brain drain syndrome and lack of capital formation that stifle innovation. When intraregional trade is weak (in the vicinity of 10 percent) to replicate the rewards from access to global economic markets (real and financial), a brain drain syndrome or net outflow of human capital and investment cannot be allowed to fester dangerously at the expense of innovation. The viability of an optimum currency area for the region is endangered and vastly unsustainable.

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