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Further comments on the SLPP convention of 2011

18 August 2011 at 00:51 | 474 views

By Dr.Yusuf Bangura, Nyon, Switzerland.

The feedback I have received on the opinion piece “Dark Clouds on the Horizon? The SLPP Convention of 2011” has been highly positive. However, there are a few issues that have emerged in three critical responses that I would like to address. I do not intend to turn this into a debate with partisans as this can easily degenerate into name-calling and point-scoring, which may produce more heat than light.

The first issue I would like to address is the ethno-regional composition of the SLPP executive. Patrick Kagbeni Muana (PK) claims that the appropriate comparison between the APC and SLPP is their respective executives rather than the comparison I made between the APC cabinet and the SLPP executive. He then proceeded to argue that the SLPP’s executive is more national in scope than the APC’s. I have three points to make on this issue.

1. My piece was not about which of the two party executives has a better national spread. Information that highlights the highly Northern-dominated character of the APC executive is not news to me. My focus was on the SLPP, which, as I argued, has an unquestioned advantage over the APC in terms of elite membership. I was disappointed that the SLPP failed to utilize this advantage and instead turned to its core South-Eastern base in its choice of flag-bearer and executive. I honestly thought that with so many non-Southern/Eastern candidates vying for leadership of the party (the first time this has happened in its recent history), the SLPP would have set the bar high for the APC by transforming the ethno-regional trajectory of our politics into one of inclusiveness. It is, sadly, a missed opportunity, which the party may come to regret. This point is completely lost on Kelfala Kallon who insists that since the SLPP executive is less than 80% South-Eastern, the party has already done well for the North and Western Area, which enjoy about one third of the delegates even though they only supply a fraction of votes to the party at national elections.

2. When a party is in government, the party executive tends to take a back seat. The public face of the party becomes that of cabinet ministers and the president. For an opposition party, the interesting organ is its executive, which speaks on public issues. In fact, if the opposition party’s parliamentarians are well-resourced and policy focused, the party’s executive may not even play a substantial role in public discourse. In the United States, for instance, one hardly hears the voices of Republican Party executive members. It is the party leaders in the House of Representatives and Senate who call the shots. It is a sad commentary on the caliber of our parliamentarians on the opposition benches that the voice of the party is only seriously heard at the party’s headquarters. Let me hasten to add here that this is a problem for most African political parties. Once they lose power, and by implication access to the state bureaucracy for policy guidance, they become bereft of ideas on the core areas of government.

3. The SLPP executive list of 31 members that shows a relatively equal distribution of members across the four regions is deceptive. The 31 members are the same “green” oranges alright, as PK would like readers to believe. However, only some have enough juice to be called oranges. The core offices of most party executives are the flag-bearer, the chairman, the secretary general, the organizing secretary, the publicity secretary, and the financial secretary (these are two posts in the SLPP executive). All these positions, except for the secretary general (Sulaiman Banja Tejan-Sie who almost lost to a Southerner) went to the South and East. Deputies are mere shadows; they hardly do anything. Similarly, the positions of Northern, Eastern, Southern and Western Area Chairmen do not carry much weight especially in countries with unitary polities and party systems. The relative insignificance of these offices is the same as the superfluous positions of resident ministers for the South, North and East in a context where there is a substantive minister of the interior. In addition, creating party wings for women and youth does not cut it in the real dynamics of power. The best way to improve gender and youth representation in party systems is by electing women and youth to the top seven or eight posts. Women and youth leaders who head party wings are likely to stay on the wings and not at the centre of policy making. And other posts, such as Chief Imam and Chaplain, are, surely, purely decorative.

The second issue I would like to address is the dynamics that led to Maada Bio’s election. I am really surprised that Kelfala Kallon leans on Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action theory to explain Bio’s victory. Olson’s theory applies to situations in which a small group of people that are highly organized and feel strongly about their interests can impose their choices on society if they are the only organized game in town. It assumes a very large electorate in which other citizens do not hold strong views on the issue the organized group is interested in. However, in the SLPP election, the electorate (the 602 delegates) is very small, highly partisan, strongly mobilized, and willing to act out its choices on the only issue at stake, which is the election of a flag-bearer. It is theoretically spurious to assume that only Bio’s mob had strong preferences without considering the external supporters of the other candidates who surely must also have strong preferences. Recall that Bio only scored 39.5% of the vote. More than 60% of delegates still rejected his group’s pressure.

The best explanation for Bio’s victory in plain political science analysis is the voting system and fielding of too many candidates for the same post. Immediately I saw the results for the chairmanship position in which Abbas Bundu, the reported candidate of the Bio camp, obtained 35% of the votes, I concluded that Bio stood a very strong chance of winning the election if those who voted for Bundu decided to vote for him and the remaining 65% of the votes were spread equally among the other 18 candidates. Under the first past the post rules the party adopted, and with 19 candidates, it is quite possible for a winner to have emerged with even less than 6% of the votes. A candidate that appeals to the party’s ethno-regional base could have been defeated if a majoritarian system, such as the alternative vote, had been used that ranks candidates and progressively distributes the second and other preference votes of last placed candidates to top candidates until a winner emerges with more than 50% of the votes.

Kelfala also states that he spoke to delegates at the convention who told him that the reason they voted for Bio was because he brought democracy to Sierra Leone that lifted the SLPP out of the political wilderness. Marx once famously remarked in his critique of empiricism that ‘things do not always appear as they are; a stick dipped in water may appear broken when in actual fact it is not’. It is poor scholarship to accept what people say at face value. The job of an analyst is to get behind ideological justification of choices and reveal what people really want and do. Recall that Foday Sankoh and the RUF also told the public that their war was to liberate Sierra Leone from poverty, underdevelopment and corruption. Their actual practice revealed otherwise. I am not a party member but would like to believe that I am a good listener and do not respect political boundaries in my social interactions. The three hypotheses I posited on the choice of Bio are not mere inventions but reflect strongly held views among party supporters. There are many in the party who are not only chauvinistic but who believe that only a militarist like Bio stands a chance of winning power back from the APC since he has done it before. Urbane professionals with no history of political violence like Andrew Keili and the other Southern candidates do not fit this bill and, therefore, lost out.

The third issue deals with Bio’s past. Here the best submission of the three is by my good friend, Lans Gberie, who recognizes the gravity of the issue of extra-judicial killings and calls on Bio to apologize to the public on behalf of the NPRC. I would like to remind Lans that collective responsibility does not mean that no one is responsible even if they are not named individually; indeed, it means that all members of the NPRC government were responsible for the crime, which is very serious. To use a Krio proverb, “noh wais yu fayn pahuda pahn kondo” (when something is bad, no amount of facelift will make it look good). Let me also state that Bio’s problem is not the overthrow of the APC—an act that was highly popular at the time. The NPRC coup, unlike that of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in 1997, enjoyed international recognition. The argument by APC partisans that Joseph Saidu Momoh’s government was democratically elected and that he would have handed over power to a democratically elected government is hollow. Momoh’s government was illegitimate, authoritarian and rotten to the core by the time the NPRC boys struck.

Equally nonsensical is the view that Bio is the father of Sierra Leone’s democracy. Bio was literally forced down the path of democratization by civil society, James Jonah (the elections chief), the international community and paramount chiefs who were fed up with the atrocities of both the RUF and sobels (soldiers turned rebels—a phenomenon that emerged during NPRC rule and reckless recruitment of marginalized youth on drugs into the army, as eloquently recorded in the TRC report). Indeed, it was under the NPRC that Sierra Leone achieved the notoriety of an archetypal state of “the coming anarchy” in the world system (See Robert Kaplan, Atlantic Monthly, February 1994).

Bio’s problem is with the extra-judicial killing of 26 or 29 citizens and, as has been alleged, with the sale of state assets, such as our passports, for personal gain. There are laws of war even in the battlefield. For instance, it is criminal and morally repugnant to kill without trial opponents who have been arrested, and torture is abhorrent even if prisoners had also engaged in similar acts during the course of war. In Bio’s case we are dealing with people who were unarmed, some already in prison, and all of whom were far removed from the theatre of war. Bio is on record in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report that he witnessed the torture of the victims. The questions posed by Citizen’s Advocate in Awareness Times are poignant: As a citizen and a senior member of the government, what did he do to prevent the torture and killing of these people? As Secretary of State for Information (!), why did he not challenge the government’s press release that the victims were tried by a military tribunal and found guilty of treason? The TRC report was very damning in its verdict: “The Commission is dumfounded to think that the Government of Captain Strasser, first killed people and then put them on trial”; and “The Commission holds all the leaders of the NPRC responsible for the murder of these men”. The torture and subsequent extermination of these people at Lumley beach are a crime against humanity. As I intimated in my piece, the SLPP cannot bluff its way out of the mess it has inflicted upon itself. Contrary to what Kelfala, PK, Lans and others may want to believe, the party and their flag-bearer may have to contend with legal challenges, especially from family members of the victims, human rights groups, and governments that prohibit individuals with links to human rights violations from entering their countries.

Let me conclude by saying that it is the responsibility of intellectuals to provide a mirror to society for self reflection, raise hard questions, uphold ethical and human rights standards, and suggest options in terms of how to move forward. The most unfortunate thing that can happen to an intellectual is to be trapped in narrow, ideological and exclusionary partisan politics. It is a double tragedy when the partisan politics is bereft of developmental ideas and driven instead by ethno-regional sentiments.

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