
Celebrating the 121st Anniversary of the Chalmers Report: A reappraisal and demystification of the central role of Bai Bureh, Kpana Lewis and Nyagua in the 1898 Hut Tax War.
By Kortor Kamara, USA
Now that I have caught your attention with the above title of this article, I wish to add a disclaimer, that it is in no way my intention or design to diminish the roles played by these celebrated legendary national heroes. - Bai Bureh especially in his native Karene district and the broader northern regions and Nyagua and Bai Sherbro, Kpana Lewis in the Mende and Sherbro districts of the protectorate.
However, it is my considered opinion, hypothesis and postulation, based on primary sources such as the Chalmers Report and other historical sources, that the ‘Hut Tax War’ was never a homogeneous insurrection - but was rather two separate and distinct rebellions by peoples and chiefs of the protectorate - that was fought along tribal and regional divides, largely approximating the current geo-political divide plaguing Sierra Leone.
The only thread binding the above three heroes of the hut tax war was the fact of their arrests and exile to the Gold Coast.
Like nearly all Mende chiefs, Nyagua and Kpana Lewis, though very influential warrior chiefs, were never combatants during the hut tax war. Their prior reputations as fierce warriors and leaders of the Porro society marked them for instant arrests at the outbreak of the hut tax war. As an example Governor Cardew had retorted, during his 1894 tour of the protectorate, that “the armed attitude of Chief Nyagua was not favorable to the development of trade in that district.”
Who then were the true combatant leaders of the rebellion in the Mendi and Sherbro region during the hut tax war?
The Chalmers Report as a socio-political document
As we mark the 121st anniversary, since publication of the July, 1899 Chalmers Report - officially titled “Report By Her Majesty’s Commissioner And Correspondence On The Subject Of The Insurrection In The Sierra Leone Protectorate, 1898”, Sierra Leoneans and especially those with ancestral roots in the then protectorate including socio-political historians, history buffs and others interested in the rebellions - known collectively as the hut tax war - will find the wealth of historical facts truly overwhelming in understanding our nation and peoples struggles and history.
Moreover, the 121-year old publication of thIs first comprehensively documented historical account, with testimonies by over 272 interviewed eye-witnesses and participants - including chiefs, colonial officials and their documents, Creole colony traders, missionaries, clerks and residents in the protectorate, during the Sierra Leone Protectorate Hut Tax War - deserves a greater appreciation and research as a foundational historical document of the Sierra Leone protectorate.
This Chalmers report also offers an accurate reconstruction of the socio-political and economic state of affairs, prevailing among the diverse peoples inhabiting the hinterland, prior to establishment of the protectorate, and further serves to obviate some of the racist and christian-motivated civilizing mission narratives that drove the protectorate project.
Governor Fredric Cardew, the architect of the Protectorate Ordinance and the hut tax, largely sought to refute the central findings of the Commissioner Chalmers report - by erroneously placing blame for the insurrection squarely on the desire of native chiefs to continue slave trading.
Cardew, unlike Sir Chalmers, strongly believed that the abolition of the slave trade was the root cause of the hut tax war. Sir Chalmers on the other hand, concluded that the hut tax itself and the method of its imposition, including arbitrary arrests of paramount chiefs and the wholesale plundering and killings by the Frontier Police was the root cause.
The July, 1899 report, which was presented to both Houses of the British Parliament, represented not only the official British colonial government account of the 1898 insurrections - popularly known as the Hut Tax War in the Protectorate of Sierra Leone, but of greater relevance provided a comprehensive primary-sourced documented historical, eye- witnessed accounting of the origins and causes of the rebellion, the major protagonists, the largely forgotten heroes and drivers of the conflict, the people and inhabitants of the protectorate, their governance structures pre and post the introduction of the Protectorate Ordinance of 1896, and the various harmonious trading and social relationships between the colony inhabitants and the hinterland peoples existing prior to the hut tax war.
The publication of the report also engendered and wrought open a fierce dichotomy between the forces of British imperialism and use of brute force, as represented by the colonial governor in Freetown and the liberal conclusions epitomized in the Chalmers report. As an example, despite the recommendations of the Chalmers Commission for Amnesty, following the war, many of the rebels were summarily executed in Bandajuma by the Frontier Police at end of the war.
It is regrettable though that the colonial establishment, including Lord Chamberlain In London elected to side with Governor Cardew’s warped conclusion that the cause of the hut tax war was mainly due to the desire of the chiefs to continue slave trading.
The royal commissioner, Sir David Chalmers on the other hand faulted Cardew’s haphazard proclamation and implementation of a protectorate and imposition of taxes on a people not subjects of the British realm, whom the very concept of a hut tax was largely foreign and anathema; the brutality of the frontier police forces, and their forced imprisonments of chiefs are also cited as precipitating factors.
The draconian approach in tax collection with the dreaded Frontier police remaining fully entrenched throughout the protectorate thus intensified following the defeat of the rebellions.
Historical Significance
The historical significance of this seminal report is further underscored by its classification and “selection by scholars as being culturally important and is a part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it”.
One such knowledge base the Chalmers report clearly weaves is in documentation of a robust trading and business relationship between the creoles and the peoples of the hinterland, predating the establishment of the Freetown colony and the proclamation of a protectorate.
The role of the Creoles ( exclusively referred to as Sierra Leoneans, as only the Freetown colony was truly the only internationally recognized geographical area known as Sierra Leone ), in the over century period of interactions predating the 1896 establishment of the protectorate can be pieced together by testimonies of the Creoles themselves before the Chalmers Commission. From their predatory business practices, to living in protectorate homes without payments of any rent, to the taking of wives of chiefs and marriages of convenience with protectorate women, and as purveyors of the colonial civilizing mission, the Creoles disproportionately suffered the brunt of protectorate anger during the hut tax war.
Alternative Interpretation
The war or insurrection itself should more appropriately be characterized as two separate rebellions by chiefs and peoples of the northern region, led by Bai Bureh and the other, by chiefs and peoples of the southeast region, originally led by Chief Momo Jah - in the budding protectorate, which had only recently been self-proclaimed in 1896, by the British colonialists.
The celebrated and renowned Sierra Leone historian, Dr. Arthur Abraham, writing in the International Journal of African Historical Studies Vol. 7 (1974) opined that “ official reports from the Sierra Leone protectorate on the so-called hut tax war of 1898 all naively repeat “due to the refusal of one chief, Bai Bureh to pay the hut tax, an insurrection broke out in the protectorate “.
The above interpretation and narrative, which Professor Arthur Abraham characterizes as “one of the grossest over simplifications of complex historical issues ever offered”, has nevertheless continued to gain prominence and folklore.
What the Chalmers Report however confirms is that following several peaceful protestations to colonial officials including the Governor, by chiefs from both the north and southeast of the protectorate, which subsequently was met by deployment of more frontier police forces, a policy of arrests of prominent chiefs who refused to pay the tax was effected by government.
The Freetown based colonial administration, headed by Governor Cardew needed a scapegoat to justify the horrendous war crimes, the wholesale burning down of towns and villages, killings, and plundering committed by the frontier police forces, under the command of British military officers, in their efforts at arresting Bai Bureh and other chiefs, simply for refusing to pay the hut tax created international headlines in the Freetown press and beyond. The brutality and lethality of the colonial forces, against a largely defensive posture by Bai Bureh, resulted in the British government sending over Sir Chalmers to investigate the war.
This colonial literature and history has to date remained the dominant narrative, been amplified without any significant interpretational challenges, as to its historical veracity and accuracy since the colonial period.
However, a critical analysis of the historical records, especially primary sources and accounts as documented in the Chalmers Report - which included statements by participants on all sides of the conflict, including the chiefs, the colonial military district commissioners, war boys, Creoles who served as traders and clerks to the chiefs and as inhabitants in the protectorate, missionaries and Sir Samuel Lewis, the first mayor of Freetown - document the separate and distinct nature of the rebellions in the north and the south.
The Mende Rebellion
The focus of this article is to highlight the hut tax war in the southern region of the protectorate, commonly known as the Mendi Rebellion; the causes of the rebellion, the main protagonists and chiefs who fueled the rebellion, the offensive nature of the rebellion, as opposed to the defensive nature of the Bai Bureh led Temene rebellion in the north of the country.
The Commissioner in paragraph 40 of his recommendations observed and opined that “although in Temene country Bai Bureh and other chiefs fought fairly and well against the British native troops.....the natural cruelty of the Mendes was exhibited too clearly in the many brutal murders which occurred”.
Sir Samuel Lewis further opined in testimony before the Chalmers Commission In 1898 that the “Mendes are the most revengeful people and if you draw blood from them they will seek to draw blood from you”.
Also, Lt. Colonel Cunningham reported meeting the stiffest and most determined opposition in the Sherbro and Bandajuma districts.
The Mendi rebellion ended in December 1898 with the capture, trial and executions of individuals connected with the “indiscriminate acts of violence against unsuspecting officials, missionaries, Creole traders and their families”.
The Mendes, unlike several other northern tribes like the Temnes, Limbas or Lokos, do not generally have a King over the entire tribe.
However as testimony by a Creole trader who lived in the protectorate, Mr. Williams, recounted the organizing role and influence of Chief Momo Jah as a pares inter pares leader, as follows: “at a chiefs meeting at Passambo and Juring (near Sulima) during the funeral of the principal chief of the Gallinas, chief Abdul Lahi, Momo Jah speaking on behalf of the other chiefs expressed displeasure with the hut tax and they wanted the late chief’s son, Lamin Lahi to seek a lawyer in Freetown for them”.
Proclamation of the Protectorate Ordinance
The Sierra Leone Protectorate was self-proclaimed on August 31, 1886 by Governor Cardew, “without any regard for the will nor solicitation of the assent, of rural people or their leaders“.
The Protectorate Ordinance of 1896, with its resultant establishment of the first administrative districts in the protectorate by Governor Cardew, required additional revenue sources to maintain the Frontier Police and local administration.
The codification and collection of taxes in the districts of Bandajuma, Karene and Ronietta, subsequently ensued in January, 1898, despite several earlier protestations and petitions by chiefs from the affected districts.
The Chalmers Report documented at least 13 protest letters by protectorate chiefs against the protectorate ordinance and imposition of the hut tax.
These letters started as early as the October 20, 1896 letter from chiefs of Morfuay and included the December 17, 1896 and several other petitions by Temne chiefs against the protectorate ordinance; Madam Yoko’s November 3, 1896 letter regarding the protectorate ordinance; a letter signed by 64 Gallinas and Sulima chiefs, in the Bandajuma district dated December 18, 1896, including Chiefs Momo Jah and Momo Kaikai addressed to the Governor; the Bai Kompa letters dated November 19, 1896 and September 18, 1897; the December 14, 1897 chiefs of Mafwe in Bandajuma district letter culminating in the final petition addressed to the legislative council in Freetown by all the chiefs of the protectorate.
For example, according to the testimony of Sir Samuel Lewis to the Chalmers Commission in August 1898, most of the chiefs forwarded their protest letters through him to the Governor. In fact, Chiefs Momo Kaikai and Fawundu subsequently travelled to Freetown to meet with the Governor and at the time also met with Sir Samuel Lewis to register their opposition to the imposition of the taxes.
The War
The main precipitating cause for the outbreak of hostilities in both the Temene and Mendi regions was the arrests of chiefs, for failure to timely pay the hut tax.
In Port Loko in the Karene district, the attempt to arrest Bai Bureh was the precipitating cause of the war, while in Mendi land, the arrest of a powerful Chief Momo Jah in March 1898 served as the fuse that led to the outbreak of war in April, 1898.
The southern outbreak occurred on April 27, 1898, following reports of gross atrocities being committed by the colonialists and their frontier police forces, in their pursuit of effectuating the arrest of Bai Bureh. According to witness statements by William Glassie, the arrest of Momo Jah by Sergeant Smith and a contingent of Frontier policemen in March, 1878 was the precipitant factor for the outbreak of war on April 27th, 1898.
Immediately following the arrest of Momo Jah thousands of his war boys descended on Pujehun town, from there, utilizing the secret Porro society, the war would subsequently reach every corner of Mende and Sherbro lands, in the Bandajuma and Ronietta districts. Momo Jah’s war boys, were made up of mostly Mendes and Krims, armed with guns, swords, canes and spears who launched attacks and hence started the Mendi rebellion.
The rebellion spread like wildfire, aided by the Porro secret society and safe bases established in towns like Wobange, Mokelle and Taninahun in the Bumpe areas. The Bumpe people, under their powerful chief, Grubru together with Honno of Gerihun and Fah Kondah of Baoma quickly emerged as the cog and leading leaders of the rebellion in Mende land, in the aftermath of the detention and imprisonments of the original leaders.
During the detention and imprisonment of the chiefs, chief Amino of Sinkima reportedly sent messages that war was imminent and that all able bodied men must go to Bandajuma to release the chiefs from prison. For example, even the chief of Serabu, Makafui (Makavorey ?), though sick was sent a burnt leaf by the powerful chief Grubru, which signified his help was needed for the war effort.
According to the Chalmers report, this state of affairs resulted in the murder of several male British subjects and their properties plundered in Bandajuma, Kwallu and Sulima districts - thus heralding the outbreak of an 8 month war conflict.
Prior to his 1889 arrest, Momo Jah had extensively lobbied other chiefs, in the period from 1896 and advised his subjects not to pay the tax. Together with Bai Bureh, the British had sought on several occasions to arrest him in Pujehun. The Frontier police in nearby Bandajuma had made several search and arrest raids in attempts to arrest him but had failed, resulting in the police plundering of Pujehun.
The District Commissioner of Bandajuma district, Captain C.E Carr had summoned all influential chiefs in the district to a meeting at Mafwe, along the upper Jon river on January 10, 1898 to discuss the hut tax. During this meeting, which included the powerful chief Momo Jah, it was made known by the assembled chiefs that they were seriously opposed to the imposition and collection of the hut tax.
The mainland Sherbro chiefs, under the jurisdiction of Bandajuma district, had also already expressed their opposition and inability to pay the tax.
The powerful Bai Sherbro, Kpana Lewis had even led protestation to the Governor, during when he was told that Sherbro Island was not subject to the provisions of the protectorate ordinance and thus not subject to payment of the hut tax. This ensured the sidelining of Kpana Lewis as an active participant in the war. However, he was subsequently arrested for his prominence in the Porro society and was exiled and died in the Gold Coast.
The District Commissioner proceeded to arrest such influential chiefs like Momo Jah, Thomas Bongo of Bandajuma, Baha of Mafwe, Berri of Bongo, Sissi Koko alas Adolphus Dick of Jong, who represented Queen Betsy Gay and Chief Vandi of Krim. These chiefs, including Momo Jah were later transported to Bandajuma and imprisoned at the Frontier Police headquarters, until taxes were paid for their towns.
The Bandajuma District
To better understand the hut tax war in the Mendi and Sherbro regions of the protectorate in 1898, one must first know about the Bandajuma district and its central role in providing command and control and the war boys who fought the hut tax war.
Bandajuma district was comprised of several chiefdoms in present day Kenema, Moyamba, Bo, Bonthe districts and all of Pujehun district.
The Mendi uprising thus could be noted to have started in Pujehun, in the Bandajuma district by Momo Jah’s war boys. The territory of Bumpe, Gerihun and Baoma, including their chiefs were all part of the Bandajuma district.
According to several eyewitness testimony before the Chalmers Commission, the following listed chiefs were the principal leaders of the Mendi rebellion in the hut tax war and most were executed in Bandajuma at the end of the war:
1) Chief Grubru - Head Chief of Bumpe.
2) Bandi Brah - Speaker to Grubru.
3) Sepe - Headman to Grubru.
4) Baru - Chief of Tanino in Banya Country.
5) Kaidenneh - Headman of Mafwe.
6) Honno of Gerihun - He brought the war to Mafwe.
7) Kangagu - Headman of Tinino
8) Katta of Lowa ( on the Jong River )
9) Duvube - Bigman of Jihaw.
10) Bongo of Tanino - chief of Tanino
I have always remained fascinated with the central role played by Bandajuma in the administrative governance of the pre and post protectorate period, ever since secondary school when one of my teacher’s decided to embark on a historical research of the Pujehun district and was recruited to serve as an interpreter.
Bandajuma town, in present day Pujehun district nestled along the banks of the Wanjie River, emerged in the late 1880s as an important regional headquarters of the frontier police force, established by the British colonialists, as they sought to subjugate and pacify the interior of Sierra Leone.
From being a regional headquarters, hosting one of two Frontier police force headquarters throughout the protectorate, and seat of the first District Commissioner for much of today’s South-eastern region, Bandajuma Sowa, the headquarters of Bandajuma district, witnessed intense fighting during the war.
The rebellion and uprising started in Bandajuma district where trials and executions in the aftermath of the Hut Tax war later took place at the frontier police headquarters.
This prominent town’s subsequent demise, requires a re-examining by historians.
This article narrates the two separate rebellions, which became known as the Hut Tax War, with emphasis on the southern and to a lesser extent eastern regions role, highlighting the names of leading chiefs and participants most of whose roles have remained buried with a flawed narrative, largely written and propagated by the victors - the British colonial administration!
As a member of a team of students, including the late Taziff Koroma, who served as interpreters for the historian Dr. Adam Jones, in writing his groundbreaking book on the Gallinas Kingdom, the author, Kortor Kamara (photo), was fortunate to have served as the interpreter when Dr. Jones interviewed the late Paramount Chief Sidie Sowa in Bandajuma Sowa in 1974.
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