By Binneh Minteh, Guest Writer, USA.
In the most recent studies of small states, modern contemporary scholars of international affairs have argued that the best way to ward off failure for resource-poor, and aid dependent small states is engagement to nurture institutions posing threats to socio-economic and socio-political architectures of governance.
The case of minuscule resource poor Gambia must be no exception to such modern contemporary analyses, in the study of small state politics and transformations.
Over the past decade, The Gambia has undergone a barrage of sanctions as a result of internal political transformations protected by the international doctrine of Sovereignty – non-interference in the internal affairs of nation states.
It could be recalled that following the military coup of July, 22nd 1994, a suspension of developmental aid by developmental partners (The European Union (EU), The United States (US), The International Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank (WB), was the characteristic of Gambia’s relation with donors. The argument behind such decisions was based on deeply rooted institutional modus operandi, democratic deficits being the driving factor. Aid was withheld until donors were convinced that the Gambia successfully embarked on proper democratic reforms through a national leverage of elections.
Even the Office of The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-Gambia Branch, which provides millions of dollars of Development Aid in agricultural and private sector development, was moved to Dakar in the aftermath of the coup. The decision, though inconsistent with eligibility criteria guiding aid, it is the Gambian people who suffered terribly. Such developmental aid should only be suspended for small states when there is wide scale violent political instability threatening peace, and the functioning dynamism of citizens, and the private sector in general.
In the interim periods that marred the suspension of aid, what implications did that have for The Gambia? What lessons have donors learned from the sanctions? And is suspending aid our best way of bringing about democratic changes for fragile and resource –poor small states?
These are some of the questions that all donors and other actors across the political landscape of The Gambia must objectively ponder.
Research in the study of small states showed that when resource- poor and aid dependent small states are confronted with sanctions, they are faced with no alternative, but defiance and a hostile foreign policy. Their foreign policy along the global political spectrum shifts for legitimate reasons of survival, stability and security. In the Gambia, the young military leaders understood that maintaining and providing the means for the institutions of the country was a determining factor in safe guarding the nation’s identity as a sovereign state.
When national reserves were exhausted, and there were no other development aid from donors, a hostile foreign policy towards donor countries, and aid from new developmental partners was the epitome of Gambia’s development and security agenda. Using the theoretical analysis by Gottwald and McGowan, The Gambia’s foreign policy shift at the time was purely an adaptation to external events in order to secure satisfactory performance of domestic structures – The Executive, the Judiciary, The Legislative and The Private and Public sectors notably.
Although some scholars contend such foreign policy shift to be irrational, one could argue that The Gambia’s foreign policy at the time was one rational policy shift that any government would adopt in guaranteeing security and stability. And all these could only be attained through funding from aid, to support all the logistics involved. Suspending aid in the aftermath of the July, 22nd 1994 military coup was therefore not necessary, because The Gambia badly needed that aid as a resource-poor aid- dependent state in a fragile political region that was dealing with the civil wars of Liberia and Sierra-Leone, and political instability in neighboring Casamance, Senegal and Guinea – Bissau.
Even though a relative amount of aid was coming from Taiwan, Venezuela and the league of Arab nations, the Gambia was ranked 161 out of 174 countries worldwide (HDR, 2000), with a Human Development Index of 0.3987 and 64% of its population living below the poverty line (1998). Even reports from both the World Bank and The International Monetary Fund in the periods from 1994 – 2002 indicated an off-set in trade, foreign investment, and growth.
There is no doubt that challenges in the socio-economic and socio-political landscape of The Gambia still abound. Human rights concerns have become an abysmal concern for donors. For example in June 2006, The Board of Directors of the U.S Millennium Challenge Compact Program suspended Gambia’s eligibility as a result of “documented evidence of human rights abuses, increased restrictions on political rights, civil liberties and press freedom, as well as worsening economic policies and anti-corruption efforts.”
Nonetheless, in view of the Gambia’s economic background as a poor resource aid dependent country, and its fragile political architecture, suspending The Gambia’s eligibility for the US Millennium Challenge Compact Program is not necessary. The Gambia needs that aid especially at a time when the global economic meltdown continues to adversely shape developing economies across the world. Such an aid could have a positive impact on both the socio-economic and socio-political structures of the country, thus strengthening institutions to effectively deliver through respective programs.
Taking an in-depth analysis of political transformations in the aftermath of the July 22nd 1994 military coup, one could satisfactorily contend that apart from human rights issues, notably press freedom, the Gambia has made considerable progress in agriculture, healthcare, education, infrastructural development and communication technologies. Progress has also been made in the empowerment of youth and women in particular and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals that government is progressively confronting.
The country’s armed forces have also played excellent roles in peace-keeping operations and missions around the world - notably peace missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and Bosnia.
Reports further indicate that the administration of President Jammeh has a zero tolerance policy in dealing with corruption. Some analysts contend that the spate of hirings and firings of Secretaries of State, and other top government officials is the working effectiveness of The Gambian government’s quest of confronting corruption at all levels of governance.
Six journalists who were jailed for criticizing the President have been freed, according to a statement released by the Government. A new agreement with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to include international humanitarian law as a part of the country’s military training curriculum has also been signed.
These are important developments that donors could build upon to usher in positive and constructive strategies of engaging the Gambian government, but not sanctions or threats of sanctioning development aid (for example supporting a policy of national reconciliation for the nations divided political actors). Sanctioning aid will only paralyze domestic structures and the consequences tantamount to instability, political unrest and subsequently state failure just as has happened in Haiti.
Foreign Policy, developmental aid and security are three reinforcing agents that should make The Gambia’s developmental agenda, stability and survival a concern for all donors. From the contemporary scholarly studies on Political transformations in Haiti and The Dominican Republic, it is important to understand that for The Gambia to succeed in overcoming its democratic deficit and other compounding challenges developmental aid with positive and constructive engagement is the most rational strategy for institutional reforms and growth across the miniscule resource poor West African nation.
From the past experiences of aid-dependent small states, the world must understand Haiti’s political failures as a result of military involvement, isolation and sanctions by developmental partners, and the failure to confront endemic corruption. In comparison to The Gambia, Haiti is a resource –poor aid-dependent country with paralyzed state institutions caused by suspended developmental aid, and rival class structures, the resultant effect of institutionalized corruption. In the effort of making policy decisions on developmental aid for resource poor and aid dependent small states, it is important for donors to use such experiences in reinforcing and complementing decisions. The Gambia’s developmental aid and security must therefore be no exception.
In view of the critical and crucial position of resource poor and aid dependent small states across the global political spectrum, restoring Gambia’s eligibility under the US Millennium Development Compact Account, reopening the USAID Banjul Branch office will only strengthen Gambia’s security and stability, and nurture the already cordial US – Gambia relations. The European Union (EU) and other donors must also continue strengthening aid along the same parameters.
Change has come to the world and developmental partners must change the way they relate with the developing world. Such relations must be based on mutual respect, reasoning, practicality and realities on the ground. And relations with the Gambia must be no exception. That would only bridge the divide between the tiny miniscule resource poor nation with its challenges and contradictions. What else could one say?
*Binneh Minteh is a Gambian independent researcher, analyst and consultant. He could be reached by email at: bsm235@nyu.edu
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