Analysis

Abdul Karim Bangura’s Critique of the Special Court: A Second Look

26 February 2007 at 13:06 | 935 views

"As suggested by its title, Mr. Bangura’s earlier essay purported to offer a critical assessment of the Special Court and, in fact, advanced what I surmised at the time to be three main arguments. Having now re-assessed the essay, I can confidently conclude, as set out below, that Mr. Bangura’s primary objective was to discredit and, if possible, cause damage to the Special Court."

By Ishmael Taylor-Kamara

Some time ago — June 2004, to be precise— I read in a number of publications an essay (reproduced herewith for the benefit of those who may not have read it) written by Abdul Karim Bangura and titled “The Problem with the Special Court for Sierra Leone”. I recall at the time that as I waded through several pages of Mr. Bangura’s rhetoric I checked off a slew of absurd assertions that demanded to be challenged; in the end, however, I concluded there was simply too much waffle to warrant a response, and left it at that. However, much in the same way that one might take a second look at a minimalist painting, for example, and discern elements missed the first time round, I have revisited Mr. Bangura’s article, prompted by his latest commentary on the Special Court (“The Special Court’s Push for an Unfair Advantage for the Prosecutor”, February 14, 2007). As a result, I now see his earlier article in a whole new light. I have also responded here concurrently to this new salvo from Bangura on the Special Court and draw the attention of your readers to that response as they read this commentary.

As suggested by its title, Mr. Bangura’s earlier essay purported to offer a critical assessment of the Special Court and, in fact, advanced what I surmised at the time to be three main arguments. Having now re-assessed the essay, I can confidently conclude, as set out below, that Mr. Bangura’s primary objective was to discredit and, if possible, cause damage to the Special Court.

In the first of what I deemed his principal arguments, Bangura asserted that “the Special Court’s activities [were] sowing the seeds for another civil war in Sierra Leone” and “could perpetuate civil war hatred” (whatever that means). But instead of providing support for these bold claims, Bangura merely engaged in verbal trickery.
For example, Bangura complained that “the main perpetrators” of atrocities in Sierra Leone “cannot be tried” - either because they were dead or beyond the reach of the court [emphasis added]. This, of course, was pure sophistry. As Bangura obviously knew, three of the most notorious of these so-called “main perpetrators” - Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Jonny Paul Koroma of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council - had already been indicted by the Special Court, and would have been in the dock along with the other indictees but for their unfortunate demise (actual and presumed). Meanwhile, Charles Taylor, another “main perpetrator” - described by Bangura as “[t]he most prominent name of all” the indictees - has since been apprehended - an outcome Bangura surely knew could not be ruled out given the mounting international pressure at the time for Taylor to face justice, as evidenced by the string of adverse judicial rulings surrounding his status.

Next, Bangura griped about the individuals who actually were in the custody of the Court. Specifically, he bemoaned the fact that the “leaders of the Civil Defense Force (CDF), Chief Sam Hingha Norman, Moinina Fofana and Alieu Kondewa” had been indicted while certain individuals whom he claimed “helped fuel the brutal [rebel]war” remain at large - for example, President Kabbah and “foreign arms suppliers”. While one could sympathize with Bangura’s reaction to the indictments brought against the CDF top brass, the same cannot be said about his misguided accusations against President Kabbah and the arms dealers he identified in his essay; not only had he failed to articulate even one credible reason why they should be indicted, he offered no explanation as to how their non-indictment would increase the prospect of renewed conflict. It cannot escape notice also that, Bangura was silent on the unchallenged fact that some members of the CDF (as with all other factions) committed acts considered atrocities during the course of the rebel war. It is easy to understand why. While other critics of the Special Court have acknowledged these allegations and offered up reasonable defenses - the chief one being “extenuating circumstances” - Bangura sidestepped the issue, thereby evading the irrefutable counterpoint that to exempt the CDF (which as he pointed out, “liberated Sierra Leone from the rebels”) from punishment would have constituted victor’s justice.

In his second argument, Bangura asserted that “the creation of the Special Court reflect[ed] a series of double standards”. He argued that, for example, when the West and the United Nations considered options to deal with the legacy of human rights abuses against blacks in South Africa, they “pushed for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that would give perpetrators immunity”, yet in Sierra Leone they ensured that “both a TRC and a Special Court were instituted”. The implication, of course, is clear: the international community advocates different models of transitional justice for blacks and for whites - retributive justice where the violators are black and amnesties and truth commissions where the violators are white. However, nothing could be further from the truth. To begin with, it was South Africans themselves, most notably Bishop Desmond Tutu, who advocated for a truth commission at the end of the apartheid regime, arguing forcefully against the creation of a war crimes tribunal, which they believed would hinder the process of forgiveness and national reconciliation. Likewise, the impetus for the creation of a war crimes tribunal in Sierra Leone did not emanate from external quarters. The decision to establish such a body was precipitated by a request from President Kabbah for UN assistance to establish a criminal process to end impunity and strengthen the rule of law in the wake of deadly the RUF’s attacks on civilians and abduction of international peacekeepers in Sierra Leone.

It is worth noting two additional flaws in Bangura’s example of “double standards”. First, his fundamental assumptions about the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission were incorrect: contrary to his assertion, amnesty was not automatically granted to perpetrators of crimes. Amnesty was made available to those who agreed to testify, but was granted only to the extent the commission concluded that the crimes (a) were committed on behalf of a political organization or state agency and (b) promoted the objectives of those entities. Consequently, many of those who testified did not receive amnesty. Second, contrary to what Bangura would have us believe, UN-mandated as well as UN-sponsored war crimes tribunals have been established to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations of international humanitarian laws in non-African countries. The Former Yugoslavia, East Timor and Cambodia readily come to mind.
In his next example of “double standards”, Bangura advanced a rather muddled argument, speculating that “[President] Kabbah’s non-indictment by the Special Court” could have been the result of a quid-pro-quo arrangement between the governments of Sierra Leone and the United States of America. On the face of it, this is plainly absurd: I think most would agree that the world’s (arguably) lone superpower hardly needs to resort to dubious deals with the President of Sierra Leone in order to achieve its policy objectives. But in all fairness, Bangura did appear to be sincere in his naiveté; after all, he did provide what he believed to be a smoking gun: apparently, the Government Sierra Leone had signed a bilateral agreement in May 2003, agreeing not to extradite US military and diplomatic personnel or civilians to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Well, a little more research would have pointed Bangura to the fact that his tantalizing bit of evidence was just that. As of that time, the same agreement signed by Sierra Leone - a so-called Article 98 Agreement - had been signed by close to one hundred countries (including a number of leading industrial nations) under the explicit threat of U.S. suspension or restriction of military assistance. The United States opposed the ICC was not exactly a secret; after all, it did pull out of the ICC treaty and made it clear that it would advocate alternative mechanisms to address human rights violations and war crimes such as the Special Court. And, of course, the United States did become involved in the negotiation for and creation of the Special Court. However, it is simply ludicrous to suggest, as Bangura does, that it pushed for the “non-indictment” of President Kabbah in exchange for Sierra Leone’s Article 98 Agreement with the United States.

In his third and final argument, Bangura could barely conceal his desire to vilify the Special Court. In a painfully tortured (and failed) attempt to portray the Special Court’s then-Prosecutor, David Crane, as racially insensitive, Bangura trotted out two innocuous statements by the Prosecutor (taken completely out of context, of course) and proceeded to perform verbal gymnastics in order to make them sound offensive. In the first quote Bangura attributed to him, Crane is believed to be referring to Charles Taylor, when he says that “the devil is alive and he lives in West Africa”. The comment was reportedly made in response to a question from Rep. Charles Hyde, the then-Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, during a closed Committee hearing (the transcripts apparently are not available to the public). Bangura nonetheless declared Crane to be a racist on the basis of what he obviously recognized to be flimsy evidence. Thus it was not entirely a surprise that Bangura pulled out another weapon from his arsenal, bombarding the readers with a string of racially charged words - “heathen,” “uncivilized,” “backward’, “cannibals” and “monkeys” - subtly imploring us to connect the dots; that is, to equate Crane’s comment with prevailing racial attitudes at the height of Britain’s empire building, when such terms were employed to justify colonies in Africa and Asia, where, it was said, “savage” inhabitants were in need of civilization. As if that were not enough, Bangura proceeded to draw a parallel between Crane’s obviously benign use of the word “devil” and Rudyard Kipling’s use of the term “half-devil” in his controversial and, for many, racially insensitive poem, “White Man’s Burden”.
Incredibly though, Bangura was not quite done with his puerile attempt to demonize Crane, bringing out yet another of the Prosecutor’s comments to support his dubious claim of racism. This time it is Crane’s response to a question about the challenges faced by the Special Court that does the trick for him. According to Bangura, Crane’s answer - that no significant challenges existed other than the hardship of living and working in Sierra Leone at that time - “betray[ed] a racist attitude”. Of all the possible interpretations of that statement that come to mind, surely it would be a stretch to think first of racism. Blunt? Absolutely. Politically incorrect? Maybe. But racist? Hardly. Well, Bangura’s isn’t convinced; for once again he embarks on a fishing expedition, reeling in one last racist sentiment to tarnish the Prosecutor. For his finale, Bangura conjured up the term “White Man’s Grave”, the unflattering description by which Sierra Leone was known during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, a stark reference to the missionaries and other foreigners who had succumbed there to malaria and a generally inhospitable climate. Thankfully, the discovery of quinine - at least for most of us - put an end to the infamy bestowed upon Sierra Leone in that era; Bangura, however, seems willing to dredge up the past and even remain in a time warp if it suits his purpose, as it did when he wrote his article in 2004.

Having taken a fresh look at Bangura’s essay, this time round what looms most about his arguments is not so much the obvious distortions, or the critical omissions or even the clear hostility towards the Special Court. Although they are all truly exasperating, I now recognize that each of them played a necessary part in Bangura’s grand design: to create the myth that the Special Court is incapable of delivering justice. No, what is most disturbing about Bangura’s polemic is the fact that it may ultimately prove to be self-defeating. As critics such as Bangura continue to knowingly peddle the lie that the Special Court is unable to achieve even a modicum of justice, the public will inevitably come to accept this accusation as true.
In retrospect, I cannot help noticing parallels in this phenomenon with the much publicized difficulties that the organizers of the now-concluded 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece were experiencing- incidentally, at about the same time Bangura would have been writing his article. As I now recall, the Athens Games were definitely hurt by premature and unfounded predictions of terrorist attacks, and a general lack of preparedness by the Greek authorities: slow ticket sales and big name athlete withdrawals, for example; in much the same way, the Special Court stands to be undermined by the premature judgement of critics like Bangura that the court is incapable of dispensing some measure of justice. In short, the Special Court faces the risk of becoming so discredited if Bangura and critics of his ilk have their way, that the very justice they claim to advocate, will be diminished. That is, the acquittal of any of the three CDF indictees (which is not an unreasonable expectation, given the difficulty of proving command liability) and any conviction of the RUF and AFRC indictees or Charles Taylor, will inevitably be accompanied by an asterisk (*acquitted or convicted by a court with no credibility).
But like the Athens Olympics, the Special Court must face the challenges head on in order to achieve its goals. And like the Athens Olympics ultimately did, the Special Court may have a pleasant surprise for its critics.


* This article was completed on the day reports concerning the sudden death of Hinga Norman in Dakar, Senegal were received in the United States. The author wishes to advise that the article was completed prior to the announcement of the first of such reports and accordingly, does not attempt to address the impact of this sad event on the analysis set forth herein.

Ishmael Taylor-Kamara, Secretary General, Concerned Sierra Leoneans in North America, New York New York

Abdul Karim Bangura’s article

The Problem with the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

By Abdul Karim Bangura, USA.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone was created by the Sierra Leone government and the United Nations. Its mandate is to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.

While at first the Special Court seemed like the answer to Sierra Leone’s eleven-year civil war, it has now become an instrument that could perpetuate civil war hatred, as the main perpetrators cannot be tried. Other troubling aspects of the Special Court include double standards and racism. The situation prompted even the former British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone during the war years, Peter Penfold, to question the value of the war crimes tribunal. He is also quoted as saying that the court “has outlived its usefulness as such and it should be disbanded.” In essence, the continuation of the Special Court could create the conditions for another civil war in Sierra Leone.

First, of the 13 individuals who have been indicted so far, only eight have been arrested and held in a new prison complex next to the court buildings. The most troubling aspect of the eight in prison is the inclusion of the leaders of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), Chief Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa. The Kamajors, who are traditional hunters, are the backbone of the CDF. Many people throughout Sierra Leone consider members of the CDF and especially Norman to be heroes for having liberated Sierra Leone from the rebels. The Kamajors used the bush skills and traditional knowledge of forest dwellers to combat the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which had overthrown the elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in 1997 aided by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Under the leadership of Norman, the CDF collaborated with UN peacekeeping forces and British troops to end the conflict. Norman was later arrested while serving as internal affairs minister in the present government headed by Kabbah.

Meanwhile, many major culprits of the war are either dead, missing, have found asylum, or have not been indicted. The founder of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, died of a stroke while in custody in 2002. His top field commander, Sam “Mosquito” Bockarie, was killed in a shootout in Liberia in May of 2003. The AFRC leader, Johnny Paul Koroma, has disappeared since December of 2002. He is believed to be in Liberia or dead. The most prominent name of all, former Liberian President Charles Taylor, accused of arming and training the RUF in exchange for “blood diamonds,” was given a safe haven in Nigeria in August of 2003 to pave the way for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in his own country.

Also troubling is that Kabbah and the foreign arms suppliers who helped fuel the brutal war have not been indicted. In his 30-page report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the United States-based spokesman of the CDF, Rev. Alfred Sam Foray, provided evidence that reveals Kabbah’s support for and approval of CDF activities. Officials of Sandline International, a private military company, have long since been exposed for supplying weapons to Kabbah. The company and Kabbah’s government entered into some contract to train the hunters and had a deal to hire mercenaries. Sandline International is also reported to be currently operating in Iraq. In addition, Victor Bout, who is said to be notorious for delivering sophisticated weapon systems virtually everywhere in the world to all sorts of terrorist and rebel groups, was reported to have supplied weapons to warring parties in Sierra Leone. It was recently reported that Bout is now working for the United States in Iraq.
Second, the creation of the Special Court reflects a series of double standards. In the case of South Africa, after over one hundred years of whites killing, maiming, raping, torturing, and dehumanizing blacks, the United Nations and Western powers pushed for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that would give perpetrators immunity from prosecution. However, for Sierra Leone, both a TRC and a Special Court were instituted. The TRC would not provide immunity, and the Special Court has the power to prosecute and sentence those found guilty.
Another double standard is evident when one considers that the biggest sponsors of the court are the United States and Great Britain, which have contributed about $120 million to the effort. The prosecution team is run by Americans. But ironically, the United States has refused to be a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and has sought ways to undermine the ICC. One could not help but wonder whether Kabbah’s non-indictment by the Special Court is due to the fact that he signed on to the American effort, an action that was criticized by many organizations, including Amnesty International and Campaign for Good Governance.

Third, some of the statements that have been made by the Special Court’s lead prosecutor, David Crane, a white American, seem to reflect a racist attitude. For instance, during a May 16, 2003 speech, Crane stated that “...the devil is alive and he lives in West Africa.” This statement is reminiscent of the colonial days when Europeans referred to Africans as “heathen,” “uncivilized,” “backward,” “cannibals,” and “monkeys.” Even the poet Rudyard Kipling called dark-skinned people “half devil.” On the Special Court and the justice system in general, Crane stated that “Believe it not, we don’t have a lot of challenges. My challenge is more taking care of my people and keeping them healthy - both mentally and physically. It’s a tough place to live and work. Some of us have been there and fully understand the challenges to that.” So after trashing Sierra Leone’s legal system, Crane went on to elaborate on the only challenge - i.e. the white man’s grave challenge.
Finally, the Special Court’s activities are sowing the seeds for another civil war in Sierra Leone. The Kamajor did not emerge for the pursuit of short-term and narrow interests. The traditional society has been deeply entrenched in the country’s culture for hundreds of years. Its members and their relatives and friends comprise about one-third of the country’s population. As a trained traditional hunting society, its duty has always been to defend the community. The perception that its leaders are being made scapegoats for the millions of dollars that have been spent on the court will have serious consequences in the very near future. The signs of this are already evident in the recent local elections countrywide, as those considered to be supporters of the Special Court were soundly defeated in many electoral constituencies.

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